Israeli general Gadi Eizenkot announced that in 2006, as part of the Lebanon War, it was promoting a new military doctrine aimed at destroying existing infrastructure in a place so that it could not be used. This new doctrine was the Dahiya doctrine, named after the Dahiya district of Beirut. This action was aimed at destroying Hezbollah and its headquarters and completely devastated the Shiite quarter of the Lebanese capital. This Friday Hassan Nasrallahleader of Hezbollah, announced that his organization is currently not involved in the war in Gaza, despite the fact that it provides all moral support to Hamas and strongly condemns the Israeli aggressors.

Despite the military defeat in southern Lebanon in 2006 and the large number of casualties, this history and propaganda today have many talking about a conflict without a clear winner. Although Israel destroyed Hezbollah’s entire structure in Lebanon in 2006, the organization today has 100,000 troops, according to Nasrallah, and 25,000 troops, according to some analysts, and has 25,000 reservists. It is part of the Lebanese government and the government’s parliamentary coalition and at the same time has groups and subgroups in Syria and Iraq, as well as allies in Yemen and Palestine. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was such that Hezbollah today still avoids direct conflict with Israel, although it has not ceased its activities and has returned to southern Latani.

Israel is repeating what it did in 2006 in Lebanon and risks achieving the same results; Hamas is very difficult to defeat because at that time Hezbollah had not yet been defeated. “She continued to exist and even strengthened her power.”

This teaches us a lesson from the past. Currently, the Israeli government is following the same Dahiya doctrine in the Gaza Strip to fight Hamas.. That is, repeat the same thing and risk getting the same results; It is very difficult for Hamas to win a war declared by Israel if Hezbollah is not defeated at that moment. In 2006, the Israelis won a military victory, but the Shiite organization continued to exist and even strengthened its power. Thus, we can find that in addition to the statements of the Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallantor the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahuthe goal of destroying Hamas continues to exist even if they reduce Gaza City to rubble and destroy all its infrastructure.

The Lebanese Civil War in 2006 was limited to a part of Lebanon when it could have expanded to a much broader regional level due to the role of Syria, Iran, Israel and even Somalia due to the role of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU). . Likewise, none of the parties involved now wants the conflict to go beyond the Gaza Strip. And, if possible, from the north of the Gaza Strip, so as not to create more problems than necessary. This may seem cruel, but it’s not, it’s true. The obsession with having everything under control in Gaza City and, at most, the Gaza Strip is the same one that in 2006 no one wanted anything to go beyond the Latani River, despite Israeli bombings throughout country. Invasion of the territory was limited then, and remains limited now.

The Israeli government’s ongoing disagreement over the raid’s primary objective also dates back to 2006.when the government Ehud Olmert He faltered when it came to explaining the purpose of the operation. In times of national crisis such as war, uncertainty breeds tension, and tension can lead to poor or poorly calculated decisions. No one knows how long the Israeli invasion of Gaza will last or what will happen to the conquered territory, just as no one knew what Israel would do with the territory south of the Latani River. The political crisis that Netanyahu is now experiencing was not the same as Olmert’s then. The streets of Israel do not believe in the role of the prime minister.

We are in times of uncertainty, with various questions being raised about governance. And not all of them concern Israel and Palestine. For example, we must consider whether the delicate nature Ali KhameneiIran’s Supreme Leader is stipulating the role of the Islamic Republic in the conflict between Israel and Palestinian factions. Also if this explains why Hezbollah is distancing itself. Likewise, attacks that may occur on US bases in Iraq are limited to the use of drones on certain grounds.

There are also questions on the table regarding Gulf policy: how is it that Qatar, despite not recognizing Israel, is proposing a two-state solution, just like Saudi Arabia is doing. And if we expand into the Maghreb, will Israeli diplomats be pulled out of Morocco, and what role will Tunisia, which has abandoned the Islamist government, retain?

And if we return to a conflict zone, we must ask ourselves what lies behind the propaganda of the Palestinian insurgency. Just as we must reflect on why Netanyahu is so ambivalent in his statements, even if they try to convey finality.

The final question we must ask ourselves is whether what happened in Lebanon in 2006 is recent enough to be forgotten, even though whoever promoted the military operation against Beirut then is by the same actor, Israel, who is doing it now. against Gaza. This military operation did not solve a single Lebanese problem in the medium term, nor did it solve the problem of Israeli insecurity in the north., as today they have more and more units deployed for a possible attack. This did not end Hezbollah or the influence of Syria and Iran in the country.

We must therefore be cautious and seriously question the Israeli government’s claims to eliminate Hamas or Islamist influence in the Gaza Strip, as well as expectations that the medium-term security problems in the Gaza Strip will be resolved. .

Guillem Pursals He is a Doctor of Law, Master of Security, and a specialist in conflict, public security and state theory.